In Defense of Conservatism

In view of the state of current American politics, my intention in this post is to take an additional look at conservatism, particularly because Trumpism, to use a vague and inelegant term for the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, is usually discussed as a form of conservatism.

My suggestion is that while conservatives have been willing to use the Trump movement for their own policy purposes, MAGA is more accurately seen as radical than conservative.

To begin, consider the categorization of American political terms by Clinton Rossiter in his classic work, Conservatism in America, published originally in 1955 with a second, revised edition in 1962. In Chapter I, “An Introduction to Conservatism, or the Vocabulary of Right and Left,” Rossiter set forth his outline of the American political spectrum. In my own summary of his terms:

1. revolutionary radicalism: fundamental change via violence

2. radicalism: non-violent fundamental change

3. liberalism: piecemeal reform

4. conservatism: discriminating defense of society against change

5. standpattism: no change at all

6. reaction: retreat to a past social order

7. revolutionary reaction: violent return to a past social order

If you think about these for a moment, you’ll see that there is an underlying concern here. While terms like liberal, conservative, and radical can refer to substantive policy positions—e.g., the role of government in a free market, tax policy, abortion policy, etc.—the underlying concern here is instead a formal one.

Specifically, as formal terms, they indicate a political attitude towards the status quo, the existing framework of political institutions, practices, and beliefs, regardless of the substantive nature of those existing institutions, practices, and beliefs. In their formal dimension, these terms apply to any political system, and the two primary terms are “conservative” and “radical.”

Given the fact that, put simply, one can wish either to preserve the status quo or to change the status quo—whatever the substantive nature of that status quo—the question is, who has the burden of proof or justification? The touchstone is the attitude toward the system itself—the existing framework of political, social, moral, and economic life.

For the conservative, the presumption is for systemic preservation—it is change that must be justified: all things being equal, leave “it” alone. For the radical, on the other hand, the presumption is for systemic change—it is preservation that must be justified: with apologies to the current terrible situation in Los Angeles, this is the argument to “burn it all down.”

There are, then, two types of change: change within that existing framework, and there is change of the existing framework itself. The first, marginal change, is change that takes place without altering the basic outlines of established political, social, and economic systems, or the distribution of wealth, status, and power within a society. Rossiter’s categories 3, 4, and 5 (liberalism, conservatism, and “standpattism”) fit in here.

The second, fundamental change, is change in those basic outlines themselves of established political, social, and economic systems, or the distribution of wealth, status, and power within a society. Rossiter’s categories 1, 2, 6, and 7 (revolutionary radicalism, radicalism, reaction, and revolutionary reaction) fit in here.

The distinction between marginal and fundamental, of course, is not always clear. Was the introduction of the designated hitter in major-league baseball a marginal change or a fundamental change in the game of baseball? Was the introduction of the 3-point shot in basketball a marginal or a fundamental change in the game of basketball? Similarly, were the introductions of Social Security and then Medicare marginal or fundamental changes in the American social system?

In any case, why do I categorize Trumpism as radical rather than conservative? It’s the “burn it all down” theme we can see in the Capitol insurrection in 2021 and the inflammatory rhetoric we can find on so much of cable tv, talk radio, and the internet. Current threats of political violence—e.g., here, here, and here—are not the signs of a healthy, stable body politic, nor of conservatism itself.

By contrast, consider Edmund Burke’s famous statement in Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) describing his concept of conservatism:

“I would not exclude alteration neither; but even when I changed, it should be to preserve. I should be led to my remedy by a great grievance. In what I did, I should follow the example of our ancestors. I would make the reparation as nearly as possible in the style of the building. A politic caution, a guarded circumspection, a moral rather than a complexional timidity, were among the ruling principles of our forefathers in their most decided conduct. Not being illuminated with the light of which the gentlemen of France tell us they have got so abundant a, share, they acted under a strong impression of the ignorance and fallibility of mankind.”

Burkean conservatism is the political-theory manifestation of Murphy’s law—anything that could possibly go wrong, will. It’s the concern that, with our fallible reason, what looks good in the short run could be bad in the long run, and that what looks bad in the short run could turn out to be very good in the long run.

To use Rossiter’s phraseology, then, if conservatism is the discriminating defense of society against change—and the key word is “discriminating”—then the basic idea of Make America Great Again corresponds to his idea of reaction, viz., radical right, a retreat to a past social order.

Thus, my title, “In Defense of Conservatism,” refers to defending conservatism not against liberalism, but against MAGA Trumpism. Edmund Burke must be rolling over in his grave.